This paper investigates price sensitivity of demand for prescription drugs using drug purchase records for at 20% random sample of the Danish population. We identify price responsiveness by exploiting exogenous variation in prices caused by kinked reimbursement schemes and implement a regression kink design. Thus, within a unifying framework we uncover price sensitivity for different subpopulations and types of drugs. The results suggest low average price responsiveness with corresponding price elasticities ranging from -0.08 to -0.25, implying that demand is inelastic.
Introduction
During 1998-2007, real pharmaceutical spending within the OECD went up almost 50%, reaching more than USD 650 billion in 2007. Furthermore, drug spending (prescription and non-prescription) amounted to an impressive 15% of total health spending with a US growth that was more than twice of that of total health expenditures; see OECD (2009) . Spending on pharmaceuticals is foreseen to increase even further in the future, putting severe pressure on health care budgets. To control such spending, there is increased interest in designing optimal health insurance schemes. Necessary inputs into the construction of health insurance policies are reliable estimates of price sensitivity of demand yet the empirical evidence in this area is limited and the existing estimates vary considerably. Furthermore, different subgroups in the population do not invest the same in their own health and do not face the same budget constraints. To the extent that subgroups will also react differently to prices of prescription drugs, subgroup specific estimates are crucial.
Clearly, the task of uncovering price sensitivity of demand for drugs is complicated by the standard selection problem: individuals who purchase prescription drugs do not constitute a random part of the population; presumably they have a higher willingness to pay than individuals who refrain from buying. Moreover, even if studies attempt to deal with this essential identification problem, they are often not able to distinguish spending on one type of prescription drug from other types or even from different types of health care usage such as hospital admittance. In other cases, the type of drug is known but the price is not. This is typically solved by a combination of substantial assumptions and an imputation strategy. Finally, identification strategies often restrict the results to hold only for a specific subgroup of the overall population.
The perhaps most widely known study within this field is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), which ran from the late 1970's to the start of the 1980's. The unique feature of the HIE was that insurance plans for non-aged individuals (61 or below) were randomly assigned in 6 different locations across the US. The insurance plans differed in the size of the deductible amount, coinsurance rates and full stop-loss; an annual limit on out-of-pocket expenditures. In this sense, the study had the flavor of a randomized experiment, which has led many to consider it the gold standard in the literature. The average price elasticity of overall health care demand including prescription drugs, hospital utilization and other health care services was estimated to be -0.20 in the study, see Manning et al. (1987) and Newhouse (1993) .
While well executed and evaluated, an important limitation of the RAND HIE was that it did not consider the elderly population that accounts for a large share of medical expenditures. Recognizing this point, Contoyannis et al. (2005) estimate the price elasticity for prescription drugs in the presence of a nonlinear price schedule for the elderly people (age 65 or over) enrolled in the Quebec Public Pharmacare program in Canada exploiting time variation in cost-sharing. Their overall finding is a price elasticity ranging from -0.12 to -0.16. Similarly, Chandra et al. (forthcoming) study price responsiveness for people enrolled in California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) with focus on the elderly population. In 2001 co-payments went up for the fraction of enrollees under Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO), and in 2002 co-payments were increased for the fraction that received care through HMO's. Applying a difference-in-difference framework, the authors estimate drug utilization elasticities with respect to patient cost. Resulting elasticities range from -0.20 to -1.4.
Acknowledging the fact that price elasticities for prescription drugs are likely to be just at heterogenous across types of drugs as price elasticities for other types of products, Goldman et al (2004) and Landsman et al. (2005) study price responsiveness for different types of therapeutic groups. Using regression type analyses on pharmacy claims data combined with cross-sectional variation in health plan benefits designs, both studies find that drugs used for chronic conditions are less price sensitive (-0.1 to -0.2) than drugs used for more acute conditions (-0.3 to -0.6 ).
Furthermore, Tamblyn et al. (2001) considers both the elderly population and welfare participants in Quebec, Canada and find that demand for essential drugs reacts less to the introduction of prescription drug cost-sharing than demand for less essential drugs.
In this paper we add to the scarce but growing literature and investigate the issue of whether demand for prescription drugs is sensitive to the price. We estimate the change in the propensity to consume caused by a change in the price. All estimates of price sensitivity are uncovered within a context where individuals may be forward looking and within a market where private health insurance -that may cover part of or all costs related to prescription drugs -exists. We believe that these are the policy relevant parameters if one is interested in changing the current system marginally. 1 We use a rich register-based data set on a 20 % random sample of the Danish population in the period 2000-2003. Contrary to many existing data sets, ours includes information on therapeutic group, price, and out-of-pocket payment for every prescription drug purchase. These data are augmented with socio-economic characteristics on a yearly basis. Besides superior data, our main contributions are the following: 1) we use a regression kink design to overcome the standard selection problem. The idea is very close to that of a regression discontinuity design (see for example Lee and Lemieux (2009) ) except that instead of a shift in levels, we exploit a shift in slopes. 2 Here we directly exploit that coinsurance payments decrease in a discontinuous fashion as consumption (on a yearly basis) increases. In principle, there is no reason to think that individuals just above a given kink point are different from individuals just below -except for the fact that the price faced by individuals below the kink point decrease less with total consumption than for individuals above the kink point. Comparing the propensity to purchase for individuals who are just above and just below kink points then allows us to identify price sensitivities. While we are not the first to acknowledge the existence of this type of identification, see for example Guryan (2003) and Nielsen, Sørensen, and Taber (forthcoming), we are, to the best of our knowledge, among the very first to directly implement such a design. Recently, Card, Lee and Pei (2009) have established conditions under which the regression kink design nonparametrically identifies the "local average response" (Altonji and Matzkin (2005) ) or, equivalently, the "treatment on the treated" (Florens, Heckman, Meghir and Vytlacil (2008) ). Card, Lee and Pei (2009) also provide the only other direct implementation of a regression kink design that we are aware of. 2) Health insurance is universally supplied by the Danish government, allowing us to use a unifying identification strategy to consider estimates for the entire Danish population as well as estimates for subgroups defined by socioeconomic characteristics. Using the same identification strategy for all subgroups makes it much easier to compare estimates across subgroups. This is a major advantage compared to the existing studies that either only have access to (or exploit) a relatively young (RAND HIE) or old (Contoyannis et al. (2005) , Chandra et al. (forthcoming) ) population or do not distinguish between subpopulations. We demonstrate that estimates for relevant subgroups are of reasonable size and relate to each other in a meaningful way, which clearly increases the credibility of the overall 1 Of course, our estimates are uninformative about underlying price sensitivity in the absence of a private health insurance market. 2 In particular the tax literature has devoted considerable attention to kinks (in budget sets); see Moffitt (1990) for an early overview. Recently, these kinks have also been used as the basis for identification, for example to investigate the responsiveness of labor supply to tax schemes; see Saez (2009) and Chetty et al. (2009) . In fact, various non-linear pricing schedules are often exploited to generate instruments in the economics literature; for recent examples see Rothstein and Rouse (2007) , Nielsen, Sørensen and Taber (2008) , and Dynarski, Gruber and Li (2009). identification strategy. 3) Finally, in addition to providing subpopulation specific estimates, we also distinguish between types of drugs, something which is rarely possible simply because of lack of data.
Our results suggest that demand is inelastic; we find low average price responsiveness with a corresponding price elasticity ranging from -0.08 to -0.25, thus comparable to the results from the RAND HIE for the overall population. Individuals with lower education and income are, however, more responsive to the price. The same is true for the elderly population, though our estimates are somewhat smaller than those of Chandra et al. (forthcoming) and more in line with those of Contoyannis et al. (2005) . Finally, essential drugs that surely prevent deterioration of health and prolong life have, as expected, much lower associated average price sensitivity than the complementary set of drugs.
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents details of the Danish market for outpatient prescription drugs and subsidy policies. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework including a stylised economic model of drug purchase and links the model to parameters of interest and identification strategy. Section 4 outlines the features of the available data. Section 5
gives the results from the empirical analysis and Section 6 concludes.
The Danish Market for Outpatient Prescription Drugs
The Danish market for outpatient prescription drugs is highly regulated to secure correct handling of as well as uniform prices on drugs across pharmacies. Pharmaceutical companies report pharmacy purchase prices to the Danish Medicines Agency, who then announces retail prices. receive the lower subsidy for the part of the price below the threshold and the higher subsidy for the part of the price above the threshold. To give an example, consider an individual who considers buying a product worth DKK 100. Assume that she has a TC of DKK 400 prior to the purchasing decision. In this case, she is not subject to any subsidy should she decide to buy and she will face the full price of DKK 100. Assume then instead that her TC prior to purchasing is DKK 450. Now she will receive no subsidy for DKK 50 and a 50 % subsidy for the DKK 50 that brings her TC account above the threshold point. In this alternative scenario, the price faced by the individual is DKK 75.
A year after the first purchase of prescription drugs, TC is re-zeroed. The structure of the subsidies forms the basis for identifying the effect of prices on demand for prescription drugs as described in the following section.
Retail prices of most prescription drugs are subsidised by the government, leading to a general subsidy, though some are only subsidised if the individual has a specific diagnosis or is officially retired. This is called a conditional subsidy.
Apart from general and conditional subsidies, an individual can receive one-product, increased, chronic's, terminal, and municipality specific subsidies. In our data, we can identify the type of subsidy individuals receive. One-product subsidies concern a specific type of product (and all its substitutes) that is subject to neither a general nor a conditional subsidy. A general practitioner makes the application on behalf of the patient and the Danish Medicines Agency is decisive. If the subsidy is granted, all purchases of the given product will be added to TC in the same manner as purchases of products with general or conditional subsidies. Typically, the subsidy will be granted for life but may in certain cases be shorter (for example if the product is not to be consumed over an extended period).
As pointed out above, general and conditional subsidies are based on the subsidy price. In very rare cases, individuals are granted an increased subsidy based on a more expensive product. This only occurs if the patient is allergic to a cheaper alternative or suffers from serious side-effects. The application procedure is the same as for one-product subsidies and, if granted, purchases are added to TC. Again, the subsidy is typically granted for life. As in most countries, there exists a private health insurance market as well. The most important player in the market for prescription drugs is the company, "Danmark". "Danmark" insures about 2 million Danes. Crucial for our study is that none of the policies of "Danmark" change at the kink points described above. In fact, none of "Danmark's" policies change with yearly consumption of prescription drugs. Furthermore, it is not possible to enroll if one has purchased any prescription drugs during the last 12 months. 9 The company offers four types of policies; Group 1, 2, 5, and Basis. Group 1 and 2 insurance (about 400,000 individuals in total) covers all prescription drug expenditures related to products granted one of the government subsidies described above and 50% of all costs related to products without any government subsidy and Group 5 insurance (1.3 million individuals) that covers 50% of expenditures towards products receiving any government subsidy and 25% of costs related to products without any subsidy. Basis insurance does not cover any costs of drug purchase but individuals buying this type of insurance may -no matter their health statusopt into any of the other insurance policies at any point in time. Group 1 insurance has a yearly cost of about DKK 2,400 (in 2007), Group 2 insurance costs DKK 3,200, Group 5 insurance about DKK 1,000, and Basis about DKK 400. When we discuss our identification strategy below, we will also explicitly address the implications of this private option.
Conceptual Framework
In order to emphasize the identifying assumptions behind our estimation strategy and to provide a framework for interpreting our empirical results, this section firstly presents a stylised economic 9 Individuals aged 61 or above cannot enrol either.
model of drug purchase. The model is set within the regime described in Section 3 above, where the crucial feature is that prescription drug subsidies vary with total consumption. We next discuss parameters of interest and identification.
At each point in time, an individual experiences a risk of becoming ill and an associated need to buy a given prescription drug. This risk is specific to the individual and may vary with characteristics, observable as well as unobservable, and behavior. Therefore, at each point in time, the individual must decide whether or not to purchase the drug. Since prescription drug purchase, by definition, and, all other things being equal, individuals who receive a lower subsidy will be less likely to purchase the drug.
Price sensitivity may obviously vary with the product under consideration. It is likely that demand for drugs prescribed for serious illnesses is less price sensitive than average demand. Also, the nature of the symptoms associated with a disease may affect price sensitivity of demand. Moreover, whether a condition is chronic or unexpected and temporary may affect demand. In fact, we expect forward looking individuals with chronic conditions to react on the average rather than the marginal price, see Keeler, Newhouse, and Phelps (1977) , whereas individuals affected by an unexpected and temporary condition are more likely to react on the marginal price; in our setting, a forward looking individual with a chronic condition knows that he will need treatment for a long period and that buying today will lower the price of the product tomorrow. The same is not true (at least not to the same degree) for somebody who only expects to consume a small amount in the future. Finally, individuals with different socio-economic characteristics may react differently. We investigate some of these issues in our empirical analyses below.
Parameters of Interest and Identification Strategy
In principle, we are interested in uncovering the entire demand curve for a given prescription drug.
In other words, how does the propensity to buy a given product change with the price?
Unfortunately, the available data does not allow for that without strict parametric assumptions. We can, however, non-parametrically uncover parts of the demand curve by exploiting the structure of the subsidies described above.
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the subsidy scheme introduces exogenous variation in the price of a given product. Formally, denote the price without any subsidy P . Clearly, given the subsidy scheme described above the price P faced by the consumer in a neighborhood of the first
where TC is measured prior to the purchasing decision. 
FIGURE 2
When the price is constant we obviously cannot hope to uncover any estimate of price sensitivity.
Similarly, when the price changes one-to-one with TC, we cannot distinguish the effect of higher TC (and likely worse health) from the effect of lower price. What we can exploit, on the other hand, is the shift in the slope of the P-TC curve at TC A , a so-called sharp regression kink design. 11 It is similar to a regression discontinuity design except that instead of exploiting a shift in levels, we exploit a shift in slope. In such a setting, TC is called a forcing variable. In the following we will describe the assumptions and mechanics behind the strategy.
10 Threshold values B, C, and D give rise to similar variation in the price and the identification strategy is analogous. 11 We cannot exploit the shift in slopes furthest to the left because we are considering a range of products with different prices and the location of the first shift clearly depends on the price of the product without subsidy.
Accumulated Total Costs
Price TC A Card, Lee and Pei (2009) Card, Lee and Pei (2009) show that these assumptions together imply that:
Intuitively, with the above assumptions we can estimate our parameter of interest
by comparing the slope of the propensity to consume with regards to TC for observations that are just to the right of TC A with that of observations that are just to the left while properly correcting for the deterministic shift in the relationship between P and TC. From this parameter, we can calculate implied elasticities as well as predicted changes in amounts caused by changes in the price.
Specifically, let N be the number of potential buyers and 1 be the quantity sold.
Clearly, then the percentage change in the propensity to buy caused by a percentage change in the price just equals the classic price elasticity:
To give an example of our identification strategy, assume for simplicity that the propensity to purchase a given prescription drug does not depend on health and thus in the absence of the subsidy scheme would not correlate with TC 13 but decreases linearly in the price of the product. In this case the price variation from Figure 2 will translate into a propensity to purchase the product given in Figure 3 , where we see that the subsidy scheme introduces an exogenous change in the slope of the propensity to consume at TC A .
FIGURE 3 Discussion of the identifying assumptions and their implications
Apart from a set of regularity conditions, we rely on a shift in the P-TC curve at TC A along with the assumption of smoothness of the first derivative of the density of TC conditional on W. As pointed out by Card, Lee and Pei (2009) , this latter assumption is the critical one and implies that agents must not have full control of the forcing variable, TC. The discontinuous shift in the slope of the relationship between P and TC arises immediately from the subsidy scheme as described above.
An important implication of the identifying assumptions is (c) above, which says that any predetermined variable X should have a cumulative distribution function that is differentiable with respect to TC. In other words, there must be no kink in the distribution of X. Card, Lee and Pei (2009) A second issue regarding identification concerns endogenous (or strategic) sorting with regards to TC. In the tax literature, individuals sometimes bunch at tax kink points, see Chetty et al. (2009) and Saez (2008) . In that setting, bunching is optimal because higher income increases the marginal tax rate. Therefore it might be optimal to refrain from supplying an extra hour of work. We do not worry about bunching, however, since it is suboptimal in our setting. Here, a higher level of consumption weakly reduces the price faced by the consumer. We do, nonetheless, show the distribution of observations around the kink point; see below.
Interpretation of parameter of interest
The parameter we uncover is clearly local. In fact, Card, Lee and Pei (2009) A second issue is that we estimate price sensitivity in the presence of private health insurance. As mentioned above, we do assume that individuals do not experience a shift in the propensity to take up private health insurance when their total costs increase slightly. Still, private health insurance matters for the interpretation of our results. Mechanically, because "Danmark" pays a fixed share of the costs to the patient, what the existence of private health insurance does is to shift the relationship between P and TC; it effectively diminishes the extent to which P is reduced when TC increases. In the extreme case where everybody subscribed to private health insurance and all costs of prescriptions drugs were covered by this insurance, demand would not be sensitive to the price at all. More generally, private health insurance reduces observed price sensitivity compared to a regime with no private alternative. The same holds for the additional government subsidies (chronic's, terminal, and municipality specific).
Estimation
Though our parameter of interest is non-parametrically identified, for efficiency reasons we impose local parametric assumptions. We consider a small neighborhood around the threshold value and estimate the propensity to purchase using a simple probit model, where our unit of observation is whether a consumer buys prescription drugs during a given week.
14 To demonstrate, consider the following simple model where TC enters linearly in the index:
where TC is again the total cost variable, 1 indicates whether a purchase was done just above a given kink-point j, and 1 · is the interaction of total cost and the kinkdummy. From the interaction term between the kink-dummy and TC in (2), we can calculate the (estimated) difference in the propensity to purchase caused by TC crossing threshold value j. 15 In practice, we investigate whether higher order terms of TC should be included.
In particular, take the derivative of the above expression with respect to TC to get
Since 1 is dichotomous, we simply evaluate the above derivative for 1 1 and 1 0, and then take their difference:
14 Whether we use a probit or a linear probability model does not change the conclusions from the analyses below. 15 The model is estimated under the restriction that there is no jump at the kink points yet the results are not sensitive to this.
This is our estimate of the numerator in (2). The denominator is the difference between on each side of the kink. This is immediately available from the price scheme presented above and clearly depends on the kink in question.
A couple of practical problems arise within this framework: Firstly, our identification strategy formally holds in a small neighborhood around the threshold points. In practice, we need to choose a bandwidth. The problem with comparing observations that are far away from the threshold values is, of course, that others factors beyond the difference in drug subsidy may drive the decision of drug purchase. Individuals with lower TC are, for example, less likely to be ill in the first place. For precisely this reason we need observations close to a given value of TC. On the other hand, we need a large number of observations. In general, a regression discontinuity design requires a large number of observations; see for example Lee and Lemieux (2009) . Intuitively, a regression kink design is even more data demanding because we have to estimate not a shift in levels but a shift in the slope.
Secondly, if the price of the product under consideration (or equivalently TC) is 'too low' relative to the bandwidth for individuals on the left hand side of the kink, we run the risk that the price does not depend on TC at all; we are on the leftmost flat part of the graph in Figure 1 , see also (1) above.
If this is the case, we will not get a consistent estimate of our parameter of interest. In fact, if the propensity to purchase is increasing in TC, we will likely underestimate price sensitivity. In the example in Figure 3 above, where we for expositional purposes assume that the propensity to consume does not vary with underlying health, our estimate of the price sensitivity will be zero if we use observations on the leftmost flat part as controls, whereas it is in fact negative. Conversely, if the price is 'too high' we run the risk that individuals cross the next kink point and receive an even larger subsidy for part of the price.
In the empirical analyses below we investigate how sensitive our estimates are to the choice of bandwidth. We also investigate the distribution of prices of prescription drugs. If only a small share of prices are lower than our bandwidth, the problem that we may partly identify of a part of the TC curve where the price does not depend on TC is of little importance. In the same way, if only a small share of prices are higher than the difference between the threshold points, the problem that individuals may cross the next threshold point is minor as well. If we, for example, consider the 50 % threshold point, prices should be below DKK 700 in 2000 to avoid this problem. Finally, we investigate results for products where the price is sufficiently large (larger than half the bandwidth) but also sufficiently small (smaller than the difference between two neighboring kink points).
Note that the fact that we need to estimate a shift in the slope of the propensity to purchase curve precludes the use of falsification tests where a 'fake' kink is investigated. Since the functional form of the curve is unknown and potentially differs between real and fake kink points, we cannot use the functional form specification from the actual kink points to investigate any fake kink points. Thus, we cannot identify whether a significant shift in the slope of the curve at a random fake kink point is just caused by misspecification.
Finally, in practice we can only meaningfully investigate price responsiveness in a neighborhood around the lowest kink point TC A (and to some extent around TC B ). This reflects both the paucity of the data at higher kink points as well as smaller changes in subsidies.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section first describes the available data and discusses how we construct the dependent variable as well as the forcing variable. We then present a range of descriptive statistics.
We use administrative data provided by Statistics Denmark. The data set contains information on a representative sample of 20% of all Danish individuals in the period from 2000-2003. For each individual in the sample in this period we know the complete history of prescription drug purchases including date, price, amount of subsidy, type of subsidy, and type of drug. These data are augmented with socio-economic information describing demographics, income, and education on a yearly basis. Unfortunately, we do not know diagnoses, nor do we have information on unredeemed prescription notes. Thus from the perspective of the econometrician, there are no differences between a decision not to buy after having seen a doctor and having him prescribe a product and the decision not to go to a doctor in the first place. Finally, we do not know whether an individual has private insurance. All estimates of price sensitivity are therefore estimated for potentially forward looking agents within a market where private health insurance -that may cover part of or all costs related to prescription drugs -exists. As argued above, these are also the policy relevant estimates.
In the following, we discard observations for individuals who, at the time of purchase, were below 18 years. Most importantly, the subsidy scheme described above is only valid for adults.
Additionally, young individuals are perhaps more likely to have someone else pay for their prescription drugs. Thus we would not measure their price sensitivity. Table 2 first shows our variables related to prescription drug purchases. The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) variable is a five level code for classification of drugs, which it is defined and maintained by WHO; see Table 3 for an example that explains the components of the ATC-code. 16 ,17 DDD measures the number of daily doses included on the prescription (given that the drug is used for its primary purpose). TOS is the type of subsidy associated with the prescription, see Section 2. SUB is the amount of subsidy received, while SP is the subsidy price mentioned in Section 2. NAME is the brand or the name of the company that produced the drug. The rest of the variables in Table 2 are self-explanatory. 16 Some prescription drugs are not assigned an ATC-code. This group often consists of so-called magistral medicinal products, which are drugs produced at the pharmacy. In general, these products do not qualify for subsidy. 17 See also Appendix A, Table A1 for a list of the twenty most common (in terms of number of purchases) therapeutic subgroups and Table A2 for the twenty largest therapeutic groups in terms of expenditure shares. Table A3 shows the twenty most commonly sold products. 
The dependent variable
Our dependent variable is a dummy variable for prescription drug purchase in a given week. It takes the value one if an individual purchases prescription drugs and is zero otherwise. We can think of three potential groups of individuals: 'Always-takers' who buy a product regardless of the price, 'never-takers' who never buy a product and 'compliers' who buy a product if it is sufficiently cheap, see Imbens and Angrist (1994). Since we do not know whether a prescription has been filled, never-takers will likely constitute a sizeable fraction of the zeroes. On the other hand, some individuals may not even go to the doctor in the first place because of price sensitivity. Remember though, that all the individuals we are exploiting for identification purposes have, by definition, at some point during the last 12 months been to the doctor to pick up a prescription and made a purchase. The fact that we do not observe degree of need is shared with the entire literature. It is, however, innocuous in the sense that neither never-takers nor always-takers contribute to identification of the change in the propensity to buy caused by a change in the price. All the inclusion of these two groups does is to cause a parallel (downwards or upwards) shift in the propensity to purchase drugs around the kink point. As such, they do not affect the slope of the relationship between P and TC and have therefore no impact on the identification of the percentage in the propensity to buy at a change in the price either. What will be affected, however, is the estimate of the percentage change in the propensity to purchase at a percentage change in the price; the associated implied elasticity ε. The reason is that this parameter is evaluated at the average propensity to purchase; see the definition of the elasticity on page 14 above. As such, one can think of the elasticity estimate as an upper bound of the elasticity among those with a prescription. We consider all weeks in a year so any seasonal differences in the propensity to purchase are averaged out. Note that this means that individuals may appear more than once. We account for this by clustering the standard errors at the individual level. 18 For the purpose of constructing elasticities, we consider the first purchase in a given week. This is done to avoid modeling the decision to buy a basket of products at the same time. It is unproblematic as long as it is random which product the pharmacist enters into the cash register as the first.
Constructing accumulated total costs, TC
We next need to construct the forcing variable, TC. As described in Section 2, TC is the sum of the subsidy price associated with each purchase over the individual's subsidy year. We have information on the date of purchase in the data as well as the subsidy price, so constructing TC amounts to accumulating the subsidy price for each individual for all purchases starting from March 1 2000. 365 days after the first purchase TC is re-zeroed. The next TC year starts with the first purchase after the re-zeroing.
Descriptive statistics
As pointed out above, our identifying assumptions imply that any predetermined variable X should have a cumulative distribution function that is differentiable with respect to TC. I.e. there must be no kink in the distribution of X. Figures 4-8 show the distribution of our predetermined covariates around the 50 % subsidy kink. We consider number of children, labor income, unemployment, total income, age and education. Education is a dummy for more than 12 years of schooling. Income is measured in DKK and is discounted to year 2000. Again, all variables are measured in the year prior to the purchasing decision. some of the differences in means are statistically significant at the 5 % level when considering the DKK 450-550 interval in Table 5 . Since our sample is very large (about 100,000 yearly observations in the 450-550 interval), this is expected. The differences themselves are very small.
Number of Children

19
Considering the DKK 475-525 interval in Table 6 renders the differences in means close to zero. As pointed out above, it is potentially important that our bandwidth is sufficiently small compared to the minimum price of prescription drugs and that the prices are not too high. Otherwise we run the risk of a downwards bias in our estimates. For this reason we investigate the distribution of prices. Figure 11 shows the distribution of the reference/subsidy price (see Section 2 above for further details) for sales for individuals with TC in the DKK 450-550 interval. The subsidy price is the price that determines the size of the subsidy. Only a small share of the prices is smaller than DKK 50 and the share below DKK 10 is minuscule. This is even clearer in Figure 6 where we investigate the distribution for subsidy prices below DKK 100. Figure 5 additionally shows that only a small share of the purchases is associated with a very high price. This means that the concerns regarding bias due to "small" or "large" prices are of minor importance. 
Results
This section presents our estimation results. As described above we model the decision to purchase prescription drugs in a given week using the probit specification outlined in Section 3 but add year dummies as well. Our main analyses consider the kink caused by the lowest subsidy (50 %). TC is discounted to year 2000 using the consumer price index. To secure that we correctly capture the functional form of the curve, we start out by including higher order terms of TC and test the model down. In practice, all models include TC in levels while higher order terms are insignificant. Figure 13 shows the empirical relationship between the propensity to buy and TC around the lowest kink point. 20 The solid line shows the predicted values from OLS estimation of the model in Section 3, while the dots show the average purchase propensity in DKK 1 intervals. Important for our strategy, the figure indicates that there is a shift in the slope of the purchase propensity around the lowest kink point. This is the variation we are identifying price sensitivity off. Table 8 presents the results from the formal analyses for this lower kink point. 21 As mentioned above, all standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The upper part of the table shows the results using the full set of products. The estimates are small and negative and in line with those from the existing literature. The size of the estimates does vary somewhat with the bandwidth: the estimate using a bandwidth of DKK 50 yields an elasticity of -0.08; a ten percent increase in the price decreases the propensity to buy with 0.8 per cent. This estimate is significant at the 10 % level, while the estimated elasticity using a DKK 25 bandwidth is larger in size (-0.25) and significant at the 5 % level. The middle part of the table shows results when including covariates in the analyses. We condition on the variables shown in Tables 5 and 6 above: Number of children, labor income, degree of unemployment throughout the year, income, age, and an indicator for more than 12 years of education. The size of the estimated elasticity using a DKK 25 bandwidth is reduced from -0.25 to -0.18 by this exercise yet the two estimates are not significantly different from each other. The result using a DKK 50 bandwidth is unchanged by the inclusion of covariates.
The estimates might, however, have been contaminated by purchase decisions where the price is lower than the bandwidth. Similarly, if the price is 'too high' we run the risk that individuals cross the next kink point and receive an even larger subsidy for part of the price. The lower part of Table   8 shows the results where we exclude purchases where the associated price is either too low or too high in this respect. We do not find evidence that the inclusion of 'too low' or 'too high' prices biases our estimates.
Sensitivity analysis
As discussed above, it is unlikely that all individuals react similarly to price variation. This subsection investigates whether the estimated parameters for the 50 % subsidy threshold vary across subpopulations and investigates price sensitivity at the 75 % threshold. Table 9 shows the results where we only include individuals who exclusively receive general subsidies. That is, we exclude individuals who receive any additional subsidies as outlined in Section 2. This exercise reduces sample sizes with around 50 %. Significance is, not surprisingly, affected by this but the estimates are similar to those using the full set of products. Thus there is no evidence that individuals who receive additional subsidies are more or less sensitive to the price of prescription drugs compared to individuals who receive further subsidies. T reatment effecs and implied elasticities at DKK 500 kink. S.E. clustered by Person ID. Results are not sensitive to clustering.
Avg. P is average price paid by consumers and obs. gives the number of purchases observed and the total number of observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amount that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price).
50 % SUBSIDY KINK, TC = DKK 500 Secondly, we consider differences in price sensitivity by level of education and income in Tables 10   and 11 and the results are striking. We distinguish between high and low level of education (12 years or less education versus more than 12 years of education) and high and low income (less than average income versus more than average income). Demand for prescription drugs for individuals with lower levels of education is more responsive to the price than demand for individuals with higher levels of education. Note that individuals with lower levels of education also pay a lower average price. Similarly, demand for individuals with less than average income is more price responsive than demand for individuals with higher than average income. There could be several explanations for these patterns; apart from potential differences in preferences for health investments, individuals with lower levels of income face tighter budget constraints, they could have less information about the importance of taking a particular drug, or they could be treated differently by doctors than individuals with higher socio-economic status. See for example Simeonova (2008 observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price).
50 % SUBSIDY KINK, TC = DKK 500, GENERAL SUBSIDY ONLY Avg. P is average price paid by consumers and obs. gives the number of purchases observed and the total number of observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
TABLE 10 TREATMENT EFFECT AND IMPLIED ELASTICITIES, ALL PRODUCTS,
Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amount that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price). 50 % SUBSIDY KINK, TC = DKK 500, BY EDUCATION Table 12 shows the results for three age groups: individuals under the age of 30, individuals aged 31-64, and individuals aged 65 or above. Young individuals are literally insensitive to the price; the estimates are close to zero and insignificant. Older individuals, on the other hand, are more sensitive to the price of the product. One explanation for this pattern is simply life expectancy; if one does not expect to live much longer, it may not pay off to invest much in health either; see the seminal work by Grossman (1972) on health and Becker (1964) on human capital investments more generally. Another explanation could be that the elderly population aged 65 or above also has lower levels of income though they also have higher accumulated wealth. Avg. P is average price paid by consumers and obs. gives the number of purchases observed and the total number of observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
TABLE 11 TREATMENT EFFECT AND IMPLIED ELASTICITIES, ALL PRODUCTS,
Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amount that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price). 50 % SUBSIDY KINK, TC = DKK 500, BY INCOME A fourth sensitivity analysis distinguishes between essential and other types of drugs (the complement set). Essential drugs are defined as "medications that prevent deterioration in health or prolong life and would not likely be prescribed in the absence of a definitive diagnosis", Tamblyn et al. (2001) , page 422. See Table B2 in Appendix B for the list of drugs included in the essential category. As expected, demand for essential drugs is less price responsive than demand for other Avg. P is average price paid by consumers and obs. gives the number of purchases observed and the total number of observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
TABLE 12 TREATMENT EFFECT AND IMPLIED ELASTICITIES, ALL PRODUCTS,
Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amount that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price). 50 % SUBSIDY KINK, TC = DKK 500, BY AGE types of drugs. Note though that the complement set of drugs may also include drugs that in some cases -but not always -fit the definition of essential drugs. One example is antibiotics.
We finally investigate the 75 % subsidy kink. The estimated treatment effects are still negative and slightly smaller in size. Only the result for the DKK 50 bandwidth is statistically significant.
Because of more limited sample sizes (the number of observations is reduced to around 40 % when we move from the 50 % subsidy kink to the 75 % subsidy kink) and a lower change in the subsidy at the higher kink we refrain from performing subgroup specific analyses. Avg. P is average price paid by consumers and obs. gives the number of purchases observed and the total number of observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
TABLE 13 TREATMENT EFFECT AND IMPLIED ELASTICITIES
Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amount that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price). 50 % SUBSIDY KINK, TC = DKK 500, BY DRUG TYPE Our results are not directly comparable to those from the RAND HIE (see Manning et al. (1987) and Newhouse (1993) ) since that study considered -for the non-aged population -total health care utilization and not only prescription drugs. Our results, on the other hand, are local in the sense that they are estimated around the 50 % subsidy kink point. Using a similarly aged population our results are, nonetheless, fairly close in size to those from the RAND HIE. Our study does suggest that the elderly population is more responsive to the price than the non-elderly but the results are much more in line with the Canadian study by Contoyannis et al. (2005) who find moderate price elasticities (-0.12 to -0.16) than with the US study by Chandra et al. (forthcoming) that finds large and in some specifications even elastic demand (elasticities -0.20 to -1.4). 22 An obvious explanation for these differences are differences between welfare systems but also the fact that Chandra et al.
(forthcoming) use data on former public sector employees may impact on the results. As suggested by Tamblyn et al. (2001) we find that demand for essential drugs is less sensitive to the price than less essential drugs.
22 Chandra et al. (forthcoming) argue that the products with elastic demand are those for which consumers can easily substitute into other treatments. T reatment effecs and implied elasticities at DKK 500 kink. S.E. clustered by Person ID.
that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price). Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amount
Conclusion
We estimate price sensitivity of demand for prescription drugs exploiting truly exogenous variation in the price that stems from a kinked reimbursement scheme. Within a unifying framework, we are able to address this question for different subpopulations and types of drugs. We find that demand is indeed sensitive to the price, although estimated implied elasticities are small; the overall elasticity ranges between -0.08 and -0.25 for individuals who have, so far, bought prescription drugs worth at least DKK 500 (€ 70) in a given 12-month period. There is important variation in which subgroups are affected by the price of prescription drugs. Individuals with lower income and lower education are, despite (or maybe because of) their lower average health capital, more sensitive to the price of a product. The same is true for the elderly population. Thus, policy makers should be aware that reductions in subsidies for these groups are likely to result in lower consumption and, presumably, worse health outcomes. Along similar lines, lower consumption of prescription drugs may increase the take-up of inpatient and outpatient case; see for example Chandra et al. (forthcoming) and Gaynor, Li, and Vogt (2006) for evidence of this behavior. Finally, essential drugs that surely prevent deterioration of health and keep patients alive have, as expected, much lower associated average price sensitivity than other drugs.
Appendix A TABLE A1
As can be seen from Table A1 , the type of drug most frequently used is psycholeptic drugs (antipsychotics). The second most frequently purchased type of drugs belongs to the analgesics category (pain relievers). This category covers products for severe pain (e.g. morphine) to over-thecounter products such as Panodil/Tylenol (mild pain relievers would qualify for conditional subsidy). In third place are sex hormones and modulators of the genital system. Table A2 shows therapeutic groups by expenditure shares. Here, obstructive airway disease agents (asthma medicine) dominate with psychoanaleptics (anti-depressants and ADHD drugs) and analgesics in second and third place.
Finally, Table A3 shows the 20 most frequently sold products. Here, we exploit the full ATC-code level. As can be seen, phenoxymethylpenicillin (penicillin) is the single most prescribed drug, claiming about 2.5 % of total sales. The second most sold product is paracetamol, which is a pain reliever. In third and fourth place are ibuprofen (used for anti-inflammatory and anti-rheumatic purposes) and Tramadol (a pain-reliever). 
